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Synopsis 
The development of the Shtokman field and the discussions around it is, probably, the 
most burning and controversial topic in contemporary international energy policy and Russian 
energy policy. The Shtokman gas and condensate field, located 550 km north-east of 
Murmansk was discovered in 1988. Shtokman’s explored reserves are valued at not less that 
3.8 tcm of gas and around 37 mln tons of gas condensate. 
 In 2005 Gazprom began negotiations about Shtokman’s development with eleven 
international oil and gas companies. That led in September 2005 to a short-list of five 
potential partners – the Norwegian Statoil and Norsk Hydro, the American Chevron and 
ConocoPhillips and the French Total – for a possible stake in the project. It was expected that 
Gazprom would choose the companies that would take part in consortium. But the final 
decision was postponed several times. As a result, in July 2007 Gazprom chose the first 
international partner for the development of the field - the French company Total got a 25% 
stake in the project. Some months later, in October 2007 the Norwegian StatoilHydro also 
was awarded a 24% stake in an operating company that will be responsible for planning, 
financing and building the first stage of the project.   
The thesis explores the political aspect of the development of the Shtokman field and 
analyzes Gazprom’s decisions on Shtokman. Then, this paper aims to present the economic 
perspective of the Shtokman development and to view Shtokman as opportunity for Russia to 
build up its national competence and innovation system.  
The thesis demonstrates that the political perspective seems to be central in the 
Russian energy strategy and that Gazprom’s decision on Shtokman was determined by 
economic as well as by political reasons. The “development” strategy” is not considered as 
central in Russian policy. The potential of the Shtokman project is enormous and the main 
question is whether it can become a “blessing” for Russian economy and industry. It may also 
happen that the country’s economy will follow a path close to the “resource curse” 
development – and therefore in the longer run make Russia weaker. Whether Russia is able to 
use its natural resources (the Shtokman field) for building up its national innovation system is 
a question for further research.  
 
Keywords: the Shtokman field, energy policy, innovation system, “resource curse”. 
 
  4
Contents  
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………2 
Synopsis………………………………………………………………………………………..3 
Contents……………………………………………………………………………………….4 
Illustrations……………………………………………………………………………………6 
Acronyms……………………………………………………………………………………...6 
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...7 
2. Method……………………………………………………………………………………...9  
3. World energy context……………………………………………………………………..11 
3.1. Russian energy policy……………………………………………………………………13 
3.2. Gazprom………………………………………………………………………………….14 
3.3. Putin’s academic papers………………………………………………………………….15 
3.4. Mutual dependence of Russia and Europe on energy……………………………………16 
3.5. Russia and Norway – close but distant neighbors………………………………………..18 
4. The political perspective on the Shtokman development………………………………21  
4.1. The history of development of the Shtokman field………………………………………21 
4.2. The “wave” of negotiations on the Shtokman field……………………………………...24 
4.3. Experts’ evaluations of negotiations on Shtokman………………………………………27  
4.4. Media evaluations………………………………………………………………………..29 
4.5. Other points of view on Shtokman negotiations…………………………………………31  
5. Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2020………………………………………………………..33 
6. The economic perspective on the Shtokman development……………………………. 40   
6.1. Abundant natural resources – “curse” or “blessing”?........................................................40 
6.2. Innovation and systems of innovation…………………………………………………...42 
  5
6.3. Norway’s “blessing”……………………………………………………………………44 
6.4. Shtokman’s blessing?.......................................................................................................47 
7. Conclusion and suggestions for further research………………………………………50 
References……………………………………………………………………………………52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  6
Illustrations  
1) ”The Shtokman Field” by BBC News, 2006. 
Available: news.bbc.co.uk/.../hi/newsid_6035000/6035811.stm  
 
 
Acronyms.  
CGES – Center for Global Energy Studies 
EEA - European Economic Area. 
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment  
GDP - The Gross Domestic Product per capita 
LNG – Liquified Natural Gas 
MNEs – Multinational Enterprises  
NEGP – Northern European Gas Pipeline 
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
R&D – Research and Development  
S&T - Science and Technology 
WTO – World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  7
                                                           
1. Introduction 
The energy needs of the world are growing fast, and competition for energy is on the 
rise. In addition, natural gas is becoming increasingly important for the world’s energy needs. 
Russia’s position in the production of natural gas is one of the leading in the world. As some 
experts observe, two decades from now the real potential for Russia may be in gas rather than 
oil1. Thus, development of new gas fields, such as Shtokman, is of paramount importance for 
Russia.  
The Shtokman gas and condensate field, located 550 km north-east of Murmansk was 
discovered in 1988. It has proven natural gas reserves of 3,200 bcm of the gas² about twice as 
much as the Troll field in the North Sea, Europe’s biggest producing offshore gas field. In 
September 2005, the Russian energy company Gazprom selected five companies - Statoil and 
Norsk Hydro from Norway, Total from France and Chevron Corporation and ConocoPhillips 
from the US - as finalists in a search for partners to develop the field. In October 2006, 
Gazprom chief executive Alexei Miller announced that none of the five foreign companies 
shortlisted in September would be offered minority stakes in the project. Gazprom will now 
develop the field on its own but would consider foreign companies to work as subcontractors 
in helping to develop the field. Then, in July 2007 Gazprom chose the first international 
partner for the development of the field - the French company Total got a 25% stake in the 
project. Some months later, in October 2007 the Norwegian StatoilHydro also was awarded a 
24% stake in an operating company that will be responsible for planning, financing and 
building the first stage of the project.   
Gazprom’s decisions on Shtokman can be associated with a wave – the company has 
changed the fate of Shtokman several times, thus giving hope to international partners and 
then destroying the plans of potential cooperation. As a result, negotiations on Shtokman 
provoked a lot of attention worldwide. A lot of experts pointed to the political character of the 
project, viewing Shtokman as a part of world energy game. It was claimed that Russia uses 
Shtokman in order to strengthen its great power status.  
Norway, in particular, has always had high expectations about Shtokman. As 
Godzimirski observes, by 2006 Norway seemed to be gripped by “Shtokman fever”2. What is 
important here is that Norway possesses state-of-the-art technology and offshore experience 
that could be useful in developing Shtokman. Russia, in its turn, is interested in getting access 
 
1 Hill, 2004, p.32. 
2 Godzimirski, 2007, p.15. 
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to Norwegian technology and competence. Thus, here arises another, less discussed question 
– will Russia be able to use Shtokman for building up its national competence. While the 
political aspect of the Shtokman field is broadly discussed, not so much attention is paid to the 
economic perspective. On the one hand we have Russia and its abundant natural resources and 
on the other hand we have international actors that possess necessary technology, knowledge 
and competence for developing Russian resources. Russia can use its natural resources for 
building up national competence and technology and developing innovation system. 
As some experts observe, rich natural resources do not guarantee rapid economic 
growth and, on the contrary, economists have come to see rich natural resource endowments 
as a “curse” or “precious bane” that inevitably undermines development and slows economic 
growth3. The main problem here is how to use natural resources in such a way so that they 
would generate economic growth. The notions of competence building, knowledge production 
and innovation systems are central to the process of developing a dynamic economy. 
This master thesis explores the political aspect of the development of the Shtokman 
field and then analyzes its economic perspective. The paper is divided into four parts. The 
first part aims to present the world energy context and the role of Russia in energy security. 
The second one focuses on the history of the Shtokman field and on the “wave” of 
negotiations on the project. It underlines the political character of Gazprom’s decisions on 
Shtokman. The third part discusses the Russian Energy Strategy to 2020 and points to 
priorities and objectives of country’s energy development and its collaboration with 
international actors. Finally, the last part aims to explore the economic perspective of the 
Shtokman development and to view Shtokman as opportunity for Russia to build up its 
national competence and innovation system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Ahrend, 2006, p.2.   
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2. Method 
This master thesis is based on qualitative analysis of a single case – the development 
of the Shtokman field and the discussion of how abundant natural resources can contribute to 
dynamic economic growth. In order to answer the paper’s first aim – to present world energy 
context and the role Russia plays in it – I used several sources. The problem of world energy 
supply is widely discussed and there exists a lot of literature on this topic. I used, in particular, 
the master thesis in national security affairs written by Glenn D. Roettger to present three 
main ideas of resolving situation of energy security in the world. In addition, various 
newspaper articles and publications provided me with necessary information. Works by 
Paillard and Fredholm were also very helpful. In the first chapter I present some central points 
of Vladimir Putin’s academic writing on Russian natural resource policy. This document 
helped me to present to the priorities of Russian energy policy. Since the original thesis is not 
publicly available neither in Russian nor in English, I used the paper by Harley Balzer 
“Vladimir Putin’s Academic Writings and Russian Natural Resource Policy”. Here it is 
necessary to mention that it was much easier to get access to international sources of 
information on the development of the Shtokman field than to Russian documents. 
Unfortunately, I didn’t find any relevant literature in the Russian National Library in 
St.Petersburg. Besides, search systems there are quite outdated and it made it difficult to get 
access to the needed literature.  
The second aim of this thesis was to present the political perspective on the 
development of Shtokman. First I used works written by Arild Moe, Deputy Director and 
Senior Research Fellow at Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo, to present the history of the 
Shtokman development. His article “Sjtokman-beslutningen: Forklaringer og implikasjoner” 
focuses on the political aspect of question and underlines the Norwegian interest in the 
development of the field. Jakub Godzimirski, Senior Research Fellow at Norwegian Institute 
of International Affairs (NUPI) has published several articles on the development of 
Shtokman, for example, “Energy and Identity – Readings of Shtokman and NEGP”. By 
focusing on works by Moe and Godzimirski I was able to discern how experts commented the 
debate around Shtokman. Then, Russian newspapers, such as “Ekspert”, “Vedomosti” and 
“Rossijskaya gazeta” provided me with information of how Russian media commented 
Gazprom’s decisions on Shtokman. In addition, I found an interesting article by A.M.Samsam 
Bakhtiari (October 2006), who was a senior expert employed by the National Iranian Oil 
Company and advisor to the Oil Depletion Analysis Centre. I used it to present an “external” 
point of view on the topic. 
  10
The whole fifth chapter is dedicated to the Russian Energy Strategy to 2020. I discuss 
some parts of this document in order to point to priorities and objectives of Russia’s energy 
development and collaboration with international actors. This paper, unlike Putin’s academic 
paper, is publicly available. 
After discussing the political perspective of the Shtokman field, I addressed the 
question of economic development. First, I examined how abundant natural resources may 
become a “curse” for economic development. Works by Sachs and Warner, Olav Wicken and 
Keith Smiths provided me with theoretical approaches to this issue. The article by Ferranti, 
Perry, Lederman and Maloney helped me to get a better overview of how different countries 
managed/did not manage to use their natural resource base for successful development of their 
economies. 
The discussion about innovation and systems of innovation theories was based for the 
most part on the articles of various researches published in “The Oxford Handbook of 
Innovation”. In addition, I used the paper by Kline and Rosenberg for examining this 
question.   
Of great importance for the discussion about the history of building up the oil industry 
in Norway was the book by Olsen and Sejersted. There they presented the main stages in the 
developing the oil activity in Norway. This book also served as a basis for the following 
examination of common features in Norwegian and Russian energy policies.  
Websites of the organizations mentioned in the thesis were useful when particular 
information about the dates, worldviews and methods of work was needed.  
I chose to base my master thesis on both Russian, Norwegian and international sources 
in order to present the objective and as far as possible complete view on the development of 
the Shtokman field.  
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3. World energy context 
The world economy is developing rapidly and according to some forecasts world 
energy consumption will increase to 30% by 2030 and it is expected that gas share in world 
consumption will come to 24%4. In recent years the problems of energy security have been 
brought to the forefront. The necessity of solutions of global energy problems, especially in 
relations between consumer countries and producer countries, has become obvious. As a 
result, more and more attention is focused on perspectives of energy security concerned with 
stability and predictability of world energy market and reliability of energy supply.  
The issue of global energy security was one of the central at G8 meeting in 
St.Petersburg in 2006. There was raised a question about security of not only energy 
consumers, but also energy producers. True energy security could be formulated only with the 
assistance of all actors: developed countries, international oil companies, countries exporters 
of oil and gas and their national companies, leading developing countries and their oil and gas 
companies, marked Manouchehr Takin, Senior Petroleum Upstream Analyst from CGES5. 
Europe is becoming ever more dependent on outside sources for its energy needs and 
the continued growth in global energy needs in both developed and emerging countries will 
be met with lacking supplies6. The search for new energy sources will continue to be the 
central theme driving the foreign policies of all the world’s greatest powers, especially in 
Europe and Russia. In this context the development of the Shtokman field takes on special 
significance both in terms of energy security, economy and foreign policy.  
From the point of view of strategic interests Russia is viewed as a key unit in the 
system of world energy security. Russia plays and will continue to play one of the main roles 
in supply and sale of carbohydrates in the world. This will inevitably lead to decisive 
consequences for world energy security 
Globalization of world energy resources represents a natural stage in their 
evolutionary development. The ultimate aim of developing the energy markets is creation of 
global energy area with common “game” rules. And it will be easier to “play” for those who 
determine the rules. Therefore there is a struggle for key positions in this area already now. 
Russia’s position in the production of natural gas is even more important than in oil 
 
4 Shpakov and Anohin, 2007, p.8. 
5 “Ekspert”, 24.07.2006. 
6 Paillard, 2007, p.5. 
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extraction. Of the total EU gas imports, about half comes from Russia. Some analysts expect 
that Europe in the future, perhaps by 2020, will depend up to 70% on Russian gas supplies7. 
Russia is also becoming an important energy trading partner for the United States though 
these two countries are at the opposite parts of the world energy “field”. Thus, situation in 
Russian energy policy and development of new fields in particular is important for many 
international actors. Another important question here is whether Russia is able to use its 
natural resources as an instrument for building up national economy and industry and 
developing technological capacities, needed for successful development of new fields, such as 
Shtokman. In the last two decades many economists have come to see rich natural resource 
endowments as a “curse” or a “precious bane” that inevitably undermines development and 
slows economic growth8. Thus, it is interesting to discuss what can be the right strategy or 
what elements are essential for dynamic development of resource based economy. 
According to Roettger, there are three main ideas for resolving the situation of energy 
security9. The first one is an EU centric approach which asks for all European countries to 
join together while planning ways of reducing dependence on Russia in the future. The second 
one is a go-it-alone attitude favored by Russia. It is claimed that Russia uses its energy 
resources as a valuable foreign policy tool. Due to the inability of the EU to establish a 
common energy policy, Russia introduces its “game” rules. The third idea is about American 
approach. It seeks to limit the Russian influence and encourages Russia to open up its natural 
resources and make them conducive to investment by trans-national corporations. But, as 
Roettger points out, this approach is problematic because it favors U.S. companies while at 
the same time touches on the taboo of foreign direct investment (FDI) of which Russia is 
resistant. 
It seems that Russia’s actions are quite rational and it is obvious that Russian energy 
policy plays a crucial role in country’s foreign policy. Thus, the Shtokman field can be 
viewed as a part of a global energy “game” where Russia takes one of the leading stands 
among all interested actors.  
 
 
 
 
7 Fredholm, 2005, p.1. 
8 Ahrend, 2006. 
9 Roettger, 2007, p.3. 
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3.1. Russian energy policy 
The image of Russia has changed greatly in the recent years in many respects thanks 
to its powerful energy policy. In addition, as many experts observe, Russian energy policy has 
been used as a political tool in foreign policy of the country. A brief analysis of some articles 
about Russia’s energy policy shows that there are many international actors who apprehend 
Russia even as a threat. “Russian analytical digest”, for instance, mentions some European 
sources where President Vladimir Putin is represented as “a gangster with a gasoline pump 
and a Soviet Commissar wielding Gazprom’s massive pipeline network”10. As we will see, 
these fears are not groundless and have reasonable basis. 
It is generally known that countries in the European Union are dependent on world 
systems of energy supply. To a great extent they are oriented to Russian oil and gas regions of 
production. Thus, this fact puts Russia in an advantageous position when it can introduce its 
own “game” rules and make the most of this situation. As many experts observe, to depend on 
Russia for energy supplies is to move from the field of pure business relationships into the 
field of politics11. But Russia has also some weak sides, such as out-of-date technological 
base of the fuel and energy complex. Cooperation with international actors can contribute a 
lot to the process of modernization and reconstruction of the existing industry complex. Some 
international actors, as Norway for instance, possess complex technologies and competence 
that are needed for offshore development. Thus, international cooperation is just essential for 
building up national competence and development of new fields and its success in many 
respects depends on rational energy and foreign policy of the country.  
The situation with gas industry is especially interesting since natural gas is becoming 
increasingly important for the world’s energy needs. Russia controls an estimated 31% of the 
global gas reserves, which makes Russia more important for gas than Saudi Arabia is for 
oil12. Russia through Gazprom is already the dominant world gas exporter. In the future, 
Russia will be able to influence gas prices on export markets by increasing or curtailing 
exports. Thus, Europe is quite anxious about Russian energy policy and is interested in 
cooperation on mutually beneficial conditions. The question is if it is possible to work out 
such conditions that will satisfy all actors of the great energy “game” which in its turn is a 
part of in
 
10 Perovic and Orttung, 2007.  
11 Fredholm, 2005, p.2 
12 Ibid., p.1. 
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The Russian government plays a crucial role in providing energy security of the 
country and has moved to take control of its energy supplies. Three predominantly state-
owned companies control 100 percent of the country’s oil and Gazprom, a joint stock 
company under state control, controls 25 percent of the world’s gas reserves. It is well-known 
fact that Gazprom’s extremely close ties with the Kremlin explain its privileged position, 
marks Paillard13. The Chairman of the Board of Directors, Dmitri Medvedev, was formerly 
Putin’s Chief of Staff and had been often mentioned as a possible successor to Putin. And, 
indeed, in May 2008 Medvedev assumed the office of President of the Russian Federation. In 
addition, Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom, Alexei Miller, is also a 
close friend of Putin. Thus, combination of energy and politics has made Gazprom an 
instrument of politico-social regulation in Russia.  
3.2.  Gazprom 
Gazprom is the world’s largest gas company basically focused on geological 
exploration, production, transmission, storage, processing and marketing of gas and other 
hydrocarbons. The state owns a 50.002 per cent controlling stake in Gazprom. The most 
important strategic goals of Gazprom are to take leading positions in the global energy 
market, increase the company’s authority and influence in the world community and ensure 
the long-term value growth14.  
Originally, Gazprom was an offshoot of the Soviet Gas Ministry, set up in 1965 when 
the USSR decided to develop the production and consumption of gas. In 1989, the USSR 
Ministry of the Gas was reorganized into gas concern named Gazprom. Then, in 1993 the 
decree of reorganization of Gazprom into Russian Joint Stock Company Gazprom was signed. 
In 1998 it became OAO Gazprom, the name it retains to this day. In 2005, the Russian state 
became the company’s majority shareholder with 50.01% of the share capital. Thus, originally 
Gazprom was a part of a ministry - a political organ, and the history of Gazprom demonstrates 
how politics is deeply intertwined with business in Russian oil and gas industry. 
Gazprom has almost total control over gas transport within and out of Russia and 
controls most gas production. In addition, the company is presented in many EU countries and 
is trying to strengthen its position in Western Europe. As Fredholm observes, Russia regards 
energy as a natural monopoly to be kept under state control. And there are no signs that the 
Russian state plans to reduce its control over these monopolies, since they provide the Russian 
 
13 Paillard, 2007, p.9. 
14 www.gazprom.com  
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government with a convenient way of regulating the energy industry and safeguarding 
strategic objectives15. 
Recently energy perspectives have had a dominating role in Russian foreign policy 
and today energy factor is the most ponderable in Russia’s negotiations with other countries. 
Gazprom, the controlled by the state Russian company, plays a significant role in this process.   
 
3.3. Putin’s academic papers 
In June 1997 Vladimir Putin defended a Candidate of Sciences degree in economics 
on the topic of “Mineral Raw Materials in the Strategy for Development of the Russian 
Economy” at the St.Petersburg Mining Institute. The text of the thesis is not publicly 
available, but those who have read the paper claim that it consists of three sections: an 
analysis of the economic conditions in St.Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast emphasizing the 
importance of natural resources in future development, a concept of strategic planning to be 
applied to resource development, and strategic planning to improve regional port facilities in 
St.Petersburg and the adjacent Leningrad Oblast, with an emphasis on facilitating natural 
resource exports16. In addition, Putin published several scientific papers related to the defense 
of the dissertation. In 1999 his article about the role of natural resources in Russia’s economy 
was published in an annual edition of the Mining Institute’s journal. Here we will present 
some central points of Putin’s dissertation and will try to draw connections between the views 
expressed in the paper and policy during Putin’s presidential terms. Here we use the article 
(2006) by Harley Balzer as a source of information about Vladimir Putin’s dissertation.  
In his paper Putin emphasizes the meaning of natural resources as the most important 
economic and political factor in sustainable development of the country. He is convinced that 
in the twenty-first century Russia’s economy will maintain its natural resource orientation. It 
is mentioned that when effectively utilized the natural resource potential becomes one of the 
most important preconditions for the entry of Russia into the world economy.  
According to the document, in the near term the strategic factor in Russia’s economic 
growth must be restructuring the national economy on the basis of the available mineral raw 
materials resources with the goal of significantly increasing its effectiveness. Then, in this 
 
15 Fredholm, 2005, p.7. 
16 Balzer, 2006 
  16
                                                           
regard the process of restructuring the national economy must have the goal of creating the 
most effective and competitive companies on both the domestic and world markets.  
Putin notes that the state might have the right to regulate the process of mineral 
resources development and use, acting in the interests of society as a whole and of individual 
property owners. He points to some problems and mentions that improvement and cardinal 
renewal of technology must be put at the forefront of entrepreneurial activity. It is necessary 
to facilitate extension of leading technologies from the MIC (Military Industrial Complex) to 
the civilian sector and the economic sphere, utilize the national discoveries that have been 
preserved and stimulate Russian scientists to new developments.  
Putin underlines that the most important goal in natural resource policy is to facilitate 
rational and effective use of Russia’s natural resource potential with the goal of meeting the 
country’s current and future needs along with exports. Thus, the natural resource complex 
remains the most important factor in the state’s development in the near term.  
Some assertions expressed in the dissertation have a lot in common with the Russian 
energy strategy to 2020 which will be discussed later. Both documents mention the 
importance of natural resources for Russian energy policy and foreign policy. In this 
connection development of new fields takes on special meaning, in our case the Shtokman 
field. But, as we have mentioned above, rich natural resource endowments do not guarantee a 
dynamic development of economy. Thus, it is of great importance to work out a strategy for 
successful development of natural resource industry. 
 
3.4. Mutual dependence of Russia and Europe on energy 
“Nezavisimaya gazeta” together with the Institute for problems of natural monopolies 
and the Institute for energy and finance has worked out the rating of dependence of countries 
on Russian oil and gas supply. As “Nezavisimaya gazeta” believes, this will help to 
understand how foreign states depend on Russia and define the driving forces of 
intergovernmental negotiations17. There are three groups of countries according to their 
dependence on Russian energy supply. The first group, A, includes the so-called “oil and gas 
satellites of Russia” or, in other words, countries that are strongly dependent on Russian 
energy. Among them are Ukraine, Moldavia, Finland, all the Baltic States and most countries 
of Eastern Europe. To the second group B belong countries in which the share of Russian oil 
 
17 http://www.ng.ru/economics/2005-12-16/1_partners.html  
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and gas is from 60% to 10%. These are Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Turkey, Greece, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus. It is mentioned that France, Germany and Italy play main roles in 
this group. They are interested in energy cooperation but at the same time are able to carry out 
their own independent policy. The third group C consists of countries that are energy 
independent from Russia, such as Norway, Holland, Denmark, Spain, Great Britain, Japan, 
India, China and USA. Thus, many European countries are interested in Russian energy 
resources to a different extent and there is no doubt that Russian energy policy affects 
relations with all international actors.  
As some experts observe, Europe needs to formulate a common energy policy toward 
Russia stressing common interests and needs18. Though it is obvious that Russia in the future 
will remain one of Europe’s most crucial suppliers of energy, the dependence will be mutual. 
Fredholm marks that while the European Union will not be able to forego Russian energy 
deliveries, Russia will for reasons of export infrastructure not be able swiftly to divert its 
energy exports elsewhere, in case the two parties cannot agree. And Russia will need the 
revenues from gas exports as badly as the European Union will need Russian energy19. Or, in 
other words, Russia and the European Union will be mutually dependent. The idea of mutual 
dependence was also supported by Igor Shuvalov, Assistant to the president of Russia. He 
mentioned that Russian method, based on security of energy producers and energy consumers, 
leads to creation of a new value – mutual dependence, and not independence from each 
other20. Mutual dependence can be laid together as mosaic of different collaboration forms of 
international companies. NEGP is an example of a bilateral project. This gas pipeline is to be 
build by 2010 under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany in order to supply the Western 
customers with Russian gas.   
Putin’s statement about the creation of a cartel of the world’s leading gas exporting 
countries, including Russia, Qatar and Iran added fuel to European concerns. In 2007 
Vladimir Putin and Qatari Emir Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani told reporters that they 
wanted more cooperation among competing gas producers in their dealings with natural gas-
consuming countries21. To Europe this would mean even higher prices for natural gas. But, as 
many experts mentioned, the idea of a gas alliance was a highly unrealistic idea. Nevertheless, 
it stirred up more uneasiness about Russia. “Russian Analytical digest” views this as a tactical 
move. In return for dropping the idea the Kremlin can ask for something and Europeans may, 
 
18 Perovic and Orttung, 2007. 
19 Fredholm, 2005, p.6. 
20 Rossijskaya biznes-gazeta, 15 August 2006. 
21 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17116262/  
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for instance, allow Gazprom to make controversial acquisitions in the European distribution 
markets.  
However, there are some pessimistic prospects about Gazprom’s gas production for 
the next years. Whether Russia manages to produce more gas and export more to Europe 
depends on several factors. One of them is development of new gas fields such as Shtokman, 
discovered in 1988 and located in the Barents Sea. But development of the field, in its turn, 
depends on developing and application of new complex technologies that Russia does not 
possess. Thus, the problem of knowledge exchange and competence building will be central 
in this process.  
 
3.5. Russia and Norway – close but distant neighbors 
While examining the collaboration between Norway and Russia, it is necessary to 
remember that these two countries have crucial differences in size and geographical positions 
as well as in historical and cultural features. As Austvik notes, Norway, as a small country, 
has a relatively insignificant influence on the world community. Russia with its vast territory 
and enormous natural resource reserves will inevitably profit from combining economic as 
well as geo-political goals22. Jakub Godzimirski mentions that in Norway Russia is still very 
much present in strategic calculations. The country is one of the elements of the so-called 
strategic triangle made up of the EU, the US and Russia23.  
Gunnar Austvik notes that as Russia moves slowly towards a market economy and 
integration into the EU and world economy, it is converging with Norwegian petroleum 
policies in some areas24. Like Norway, Russia has been influenced by downstream market 
changes and policy measures, such as market regulation and taxation. In addition, Russia has 
been able to arrange its petroleum industry in a rather independent manner, though it has no 
EEA agreement with the EU. As a result Gazprom has strengthened its position over the past 
years as a producer and transporter of gas within Russia. Austvik also notes that the Russian 
government has made efforts to strengthen the direct control of the company. He rightly 
marks that the fact that Russia is not fully integrated in the international economy, as for 
example in terms of membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), has had some 
negative impacts on Russia. Relatively low competitiveness of Russian products and a 
 
22 Austvik, 2006, p.8. 
23 Godzimirski, 2007, p.6. 
24 Austvik, 2006, p.7.  
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number of out-dated production technologies give Russia a technological disadvantage. 
Though, as “Ekspert” asserts, Russia evenly may pretend to leadership. About one fourth of 
world resources of hydrocarbon raw materials is concentrated on Russian continental shelf. A 
bigger part of these natural resources lies at great depths of the Arctic seas. Norway and 
Russia began the exploration of the shelf simultaneously, but after twenty years Norway was 
extracting more that 250 mill. tons of hydrocarbons in the North Sea, while Russia did not 
start field exploitation even in the Barents Sea or the Kara Sea. It is pointed out to several 
reasons of Russian lag: lack of experience, technologies, equipment, more complex working 
conditions than on the Norwegian shelf. In addition there is shortage of own funds and 
inability to create favorable conditions for investments25. Thus, cooperation with Norway 
would have a great meaning for the Russian energy sector. 
In spite of many differences, energy is an arena where Norway and Russia meet as 
almost equal partners, as both counties are great energy powers and important suppliers of 
energy to global and European markets. Norway and Russia have competed in energy markets 
since 1970s and are still central actors in the world energy “game”. As “Rossijskaya gazeta” 
underlines, developing of Norwegian Snøhvit and Russian Shtokman could support to form a 
model of ideal energy (and not only) cooperation between neighbors26. Jakub Godzimirski 
also notes that the High North was to become a Russian-Norwegian energy meeting point, 
where Norway was to cooperate with Russia on the development of huge energy assets. He 
points that Norway was to provide state of the art offshore technologies, while Russia was to 
retain control over its energy assets and use them as a policy tool in the country’s energy 
strategy27.    
The interesting fact is, notes “Rossijskaya gazeta”, that the program of transference of 
Norwegian oil and gas complex to the Russian border had been formulated before the names 
of strategic partners for the development of the Shtokman field were announced. Moving its 
industry to the east, Norway at the least raised chances for participation in the project and at 
the most created the base for active independent work in this region. 
Some Russian sources observe that the merger between Statoil and Hydro in 
December 2006 was stimulated by Gazprom’s decision to develop the Shtokman field on its 
 
25 Ekspert Severo-Zapad,  5 September 2005. 
26 Rossijskaya biznes-gazeta, 15 August 2006. 
27 Godzimirski, 2007, p.9. 
  20
                                                           
own28. Both companies mentioned that plan about strengthening positions on international 
market was the official reason for the merger. Information manager of Hydro Oil & Energy 
Kama Holte Strand emphasized that decision about the merger was a result of efforts to raise 
competitiveness and not a consequence of the Shtokman decision or other events29. Editor of 
“Finansavisen” Trygve Hegnar was critical towards the merger. He noted that unlike Russia, 
where Putin provided total control over oil and gas industry, the same happened in Norway by 
the merger and stock purchase but the result would be the same30. But still, many experts 
think that Shtokman has played an important role in the process of the merger of Statoil and 
Hydro.  
Thus, in spite of many differences in political and economic situations, Norway and 
Russia have great potentials for cooperation. The development of the Shtokman field can be 
viewed as an opportunity for achievement the common goals in the development of the 
Barents Sea region. Cooperation on Shtokman can contribute a lot to the settlement of other 
problems and contradictions in the region. Besides the political perspective, the development 
of Shtokman can have great consequences for the Russian economy. These two approaches 
are presented in the next chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Vedomosti, 12 Desember 2006. 
29 Ekspert, 25 December 2006. 
30 Ibid. 
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4. The political perspective on the Shtokman Development. 
 
4.1. The history of the Shtokman field development. 
The development of the Shtokman field and the discussions around it is, probably, the 
most burning and controversial topic in contemporary international energy policy and Russian 
energy policy. Just look at some Russian newspaper headlines – the Shtokman field is called 
“a puzzle”31, “a fairy tale”32, “our tomorrow”33 and so on. What is the Shtokman field and 
why the field discovered already in 1988, provokes so much attention today?  
Here we will start with presenting the political perspective of the development of the 
Shtokman field. Another perspective with the main focus on natural resources as a basis for 
development of national competence will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The Shtokman gas condensate deposit lies in the Barents Sea, in the north of Russia. 
The project of development of the Shtokman field had been initiated well before the collapse 
of the USSR. The Shtokman field was discovered in 1988 to the east of Murmansk. It lies 555 
km from land, in 350 m of water. Shtokman’s explored reserves are valued at not less that 3.8 
tcm of gas and around 37 mln tons of gas condensate. This is about twice as much as the Troll 
field in the North Sea, Europe’s biggest producing offshore gas field. The Shtokman project 
contemplates annually extracting some 70 bcm of natural gas and 0.6 mln t of gas condensate. 
This is commensurate with annual gas production in Norway that is a large gas supplier to 
Europe. An initial project stage is projected to see annual production of 22.5 bcm of natural 
gas and 205,000 t of gas condensate34.  
 
31 Ekspert Severo‐Zapad, 5 September 2005. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article21712.shtml  
 1) The Shtokman field 
In 1990 a consortium of Western companies – Arctic Star – entered an agreement with 
the Soviet Oil and Gas Ministry and started drafting feasibility study for the field. This group 
consisted of Norsk Hydro, Conoco and the Finnish companies Imatran Voima, Metra and 
Neste. On the Soviet side, Arktikmorneftegasrazvedka gradually became an active participant. 
In 1991, the group concluded that production on this field was technically feasible. As the 
project was being worked out, legislation for licensing was not in place, but the partners in 
Arctic Star were led to understand that the group would be given permission to develop the 
field35. Thus, form the very beginning the international participation in the Shtokman project 
was approved. 
Then, in winter 1992 the creation of the company Rosshelf was announced. As Arild 
Moe, Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow at Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo notes, 
the main intention behind Rosshelf was to convert technological and industrial capacities in 
the military industrial sector to use in the offshore sector36. This company encompassed 
several large industrial enterprises. The group of companies rapidly established itself as a 
contender for development rights for the Shtokman field.  
In November 1992 it was announced that Rosshelf had been granted a license to 
develop the Shtokman field. At the same time, as Moe observes, it became evident that the 
state concern for the gas industry – Gazprom – had become the main force in Rosshelf, and 
that it had acquired a controlling share of the company stocks, directly and through 
subsidiaries. In Moe’s opinion, one of Gazprom’s main motives for participation in Rosshelf 
had been to gain control over offshore activities. This would also conform with Gazprom’s 
general priorities. 
                                                            
35 Moe, 1994, p.135. 
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 It is interesting to mention that the stated goal of Rosshelf was to start building 
installations in 1996-97 and start production by the year 200037. These were rather optimistic 
plans and as we can see the production has not even started in 2008.  
Though the license for field development belonged to Rosshelf the project has in 
reality all the time been controlled by Gazprom38. But Gazprom needed the participation of 
foreign companies with offshore experience, both for technical and financial aspects of the 
project. A group comprising Norsk Hydro, Fortum, Conoco, TotalFina together with Gazprom 
worked on improvement of the geological data, development solutions, and commercial 
evaluations of the market for gas and condensate from the field. Thus, international 
companies expected to become partners in a joint project for the field in a later stage. But in 
2002 and group was dissolved and Gazprom and the state-owned Rosneft oil company formed 
50-50 joint venture “ZAO Sevmorneftegaz” to develop and operate Shtokman. In December 
2004 Rosneft sold its share to Gazprom for $ 1.7bn.  
In 2005 negotiations began about Shtokman’s development between Gazprom and 
eleven international oil and gas companies. That led in September 2005 to a short-list of five 
potential partners – the Norwegian Statoil and Norsk Hydro, the American Chevron and 
ConocoPhillips and the French Total – for a possible stake in the project. It was expected that 
Gazprom would choose the companies that would take part in consortium. But the final 
decision was postponed several times. Over the years various statements have been given 
about the start-up of the project – 2007, 2010, 2015 and 2020. 
 In Norway, as Arild Moe mentions, there was “en stigende optimisme i Norge om at 
begge de to norske selskapene ville komme med når avgjørelsen først ble tatt”39. There were 
also some statements from the Russian side about Norway as a strategic partner in energy 
sector. Shtokman would have been one of the biggest gas fields in offshore production in the 
world and at the same time would have indicated opening of the Russian arctic shelf with 
colossal gas fields. That’s why participation in the development of the Shtokman field would 
have had a great strategic importance for the involved actors and not less Norway40.  
 
 
 
37 Ibid., p.136. 
38 Moe, 2004, p.18. 
39 Moe, 2006.  
40 Ibid.  
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4.2. The “wave” of negotiations on the Shtokman field   
It was a big shock for all potential partners when Gazprom in October 2006 announced 
that it would develop one of the world’s largest offshore gas fields on its own, “thus dealing a 
huge blow to some of the world’s largest oil and gas companies, which had hoped to be part 
of a consortium”41. “Gazprom has decided the project will go ahead without international 
participation”, said chief executive Alexei Miller. 
It was, to put it mildly, a rather unexpectable decision that caused bewilderment and 
criticism from many actors abroad. International and Russian experts began immediately to 
search for reasonable explanations of Gazprom’s decision and discuss the future of the 
Shtokman field. As it has been mentioned above, there were European and American 
companies among the potential partners, or, in other words, there were two possible ways of 
Russian energy direction. On the one hand, the original destination of Shtokman gas was to be 
the East coast of the United States, with the gas transported as LNG (Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas). But later it was decided to develop a project of supplying Western Europe with Russian 
gas by building Northern European Gas Pipeline (NEGP).   
Expectations of potential partners of Gazprom were not realized and the final decision 
even caused shock. Then, as a result there appeared a lot of critical statements about Russian 
energy strategy and foreign policy. It became obvious that besides of rational explanation of 
Russia’s decision there were also political reasons. Now Gazprom was seen as a prolongation 
of the state’s political arm42.  
Nevertheless, there was no doubt that it would be almost impossible for Gazprom to 
develop Shtokman without any international assistance. Gazprom did not possess necessary 
technologies and had little experience of developing such huge gas fields as Shtokman. So, 
there still were some hopes for international actors about possible participation in the project, 
but on different conditions. First of all, the main potential partner was Norway – Russia’s 
nearest neighbor. Norway, unlike other countries, was quite restrained in criticism against 
Russia. A lot connects Russia and Norway – both countries are great energy powers, they 
have common border and work together on several projects in the North. So, in spite of the 
final decision of Gazprom, Shtokman did not close the door for possible cooperation.  
 
41 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/6035811.stm  
42 http://www.tu.no/nyheter/offshore/article54681.ece 
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July 2007 is another crucial date in the Shtokman project. Finally Gazprom got the 
first international partner for the development of the Shtokman field – the French company 
Total. As some Russian experts note, the fact that Russia now was willing to share Shtokman 
with others indicated a positive signal of its foreign policy to the West. Russia was ready to 
make a compromise when it was profitable. The interesting thing was that probably Gazprom 
had no choice43.   
The Russian Government’s position has changed several times in the last years and 
these changes have happened in parallel to changes in the foreign policy situation. The 
Shtokman field project turns as a weather-wane all the time. The new model of cooperation 
probably urges Russia to show attempts to regulate relations with international partners. The 
Kremlin has been giving such signals for a long time now, but reconsideration of plans about 
Shtokman may become the most convincing sign. The main thing now is to stop changing 
principles and to choose the right one44. 
What serves as a concession to foreign companies, can be just a need for the gas 
monopolist. As some analysts mention, in reality Gazprom is not able to start up the 
Shtokman project without any international help45. If the rules of the Shtokman game are 
determined by economic force and not by the current situation of the foreign policy, then they 
will become clearer for all participants46.  
Russian concern is on friendly terms with its consumers. It builds gas pipeline to 
Germany with Germans, to Italy – with Italians. The strategy is quite clear, though choice of 
Total was unexpectable for most of the observers. Probably it will help to increase Gazprom’s 
share on the French gas market. In addition, France has enormous impact in the European 
Union, especially if to remember that all Brussels’ bureaucracy is continuation of French 
bureaucracy47. 
Thus, as many Russian experts observe, the process of choosing partners for 
development of the Shtokman field has obvious political nature. Advanced technologies and 
offshore experience are also important factors, and there were many who predicted Norway as 
the second possible partner. As one Russian source notes, Norwegian participation is just 
 
43 Vedomosti, 10 July 2007 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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necessary48.  In addition, Norway has already been assisting Gazprom in the work on 
Shtokman for many years.  
And, as it was expected, in October 2007 StatoilHydro was awarded a 24 percent stake 
in the development of the Shtokman field. Vladimir Putin phoned Norwegian Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg about the news. The interesting thing is that the same happened when Total 
became Gazprom’s partner – president Vladimir Putin contacted Sarkozy by the telephone. 
This fact shows again that politics plays an important role in the Shtokman project.  
One the one hand, the Shtokman “fairy-tale” came back to Norway, but on the other 
hand American company ConocoPhillips was very disappointed by Gazprom’s decision. 
There were two arguments in favor of ConocoPhillips. The first one was political – Russia 
needed good relations with the USA. The second one was economic – Russia was interested 
in American gas terminals where gas from Shtokman could be delivered49. But probably the 
Norwegian technologies and experience played the conclusive role. Participation in the 
Shtokman field was the matter of national importance for Norway50. In addition, efforts to get 
a stake in Shtokman became one of the reasons why Norway decided to merge two companies 
in order to strengthen the position of formal negotiations with Russia51. Even if we do not 
take into consideration Norwegian experience, its participation was appropriate in the view of 
Moscow’s political interests. Russia and Norway have discussed the question of the border 
line in the Barents Sea in thirty years already and development of Shtokman can become a 
good instrument in settlement of these kinds of disagreements.   
Under final agreement, Gazprom will have 51 percent in Shtokman Development 
Company where StatoilHydro will get a 24 percent equity interest and Total 25 percent. 
Gazprom will be the only owner of raw materials. Shtokman Development Company will be 
responsible for planning, financing and constructing the infrastructure necessary for the first 
phase of the Shtokman development and will own the infrastructure for 25 years from start of 
commercial production.  
 
 
 
 
48 Vremya Novostej, 13 July 2007. 
49 Vedomosti, 26 October 2007 
50 Vremya Novostej, 26 October 2007. 
51 Ibid. 
  27
                                                           
4.3. Experts’ evaluations of negotiations on Shtokman  
Negotiations on the Shtokman field provoked a lot of attention and here we will 
present some points of view expressed by Norwegian and Russian experts. 
Arild Moe from Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo asserts that there were two 
justifications, one negative and one positive, of Gazprom’s decision to develop Shtokman 
without international partners. The negative one is that international companies could not give 
any assets that would correspond with the scope and reserve’s quality of the Shtokman field. 
The positive is about the guarantee of gas delivery to Europe that was an evidence of 
European priority for Gazprom52. He criticizes Gazprom for lack of information on 
company’s decision. He points out that it was obvious that the final resolution had not been 
handled in the Russian government. But president Putin, on the contrary, was good informed. 
Circumstances indicate that the final decision was met in president’s administration and not in 
Gazprom itself. As Moe fairly comments, in the case of the Shtokman field the political 
power center had been involved all the time and, in addition, both Miller and company’s 
president Dmitrij Medvedev are Putin’s men53.  
Then, here arises a question about credibility of alternative plans. Arild Moe gives 
several reasons for Russia’s cooperation with international companies. The first and, 
probably, the most important point is technology. The Shtokman field needs modern and 
complex technologies both for gas production and gas transportation. The major question is 
about the pipeline links between the field and the onshore facilities to be located at the port of 
Teriberka. Statoil hold the world record with 160 kilometers from their Snøhvit gas field to 
their LNG plant on Melkøya Island. But the Shtokman field is located 550 kilometers from 
land and it is doubtful that Gazprom will manage to build such a long pipeline on its own. 
Then, another argument is that financing and risk-sharing are also reasons for collaboration. 
And, finally, the last one is Norwegian experience with LNG-trade and access to market. All 
these three arguments seem to be right, but here we should underline once again the crucial 
role of Norwegian technologies and offshore experience. In addition, Russia has little offshore 
experience and experience with great field constructions. And Arild Moe is right when he 
states that there is a big question if Gazprom will manage to lead a complex offshore-
construction on its own though it can buy necessary technologies. A “technology” is a 
complex amalgam of knowledge, skills and devices. Even where technology is defined in 
 
52 Moe, 2006  
53 Moe, 2006 
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terms of information or knowledge, this knowledge resides, to some extent, in people and the 
skills they possess. That’s why technology transfer is a complicated process and the 
knowledge involved in skills cannot be readily codified and transmitted independently of the 
people who hold these skills54. As in our case with potential transfer of Norwegian 
technology to Russia, the international transfer of technology is likely to involve the 
international movement of labour. An important point here is that the skills necessary for 
production also include a range of ancillary skills in maintenance, repair, adoption and 
development of equipment. Beyond this, there are questions of capabilities in supervision, 
coordination and 
Jakub Godzimirski, Senior Research Fellow at Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs (NUPI) gives two rationales for cooperation between Norway and Russia. He marks 
that it is widely believed that in Putin’s Russia the Western companies would be given access 
to Russia’s mineral wealth first and foremost in a situation when the development of the new 
asserts would require competence that Russia does not possess. According to Godzimirski, 
this was also the main rationale for having accepted the Western bid for Shtokman. President 
Vladimir Putin gave his comments on the development of the Shtokman field where he 
emphasized that Norway had already developed infrastructure in the High North but at the 
same time their production sank. Thus, it would be natural to combine Norwegian and 
Russian efforts to develop Shtokman56.  
The second rationale is based on the speech of Jonas Gahr Støre, the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister. Støre underlined that developing Norway’s relations with Russia was a 
cornerstone of Norwegian High North Policy. He added that Norway was interested in 
developing a new kind of relationship built on joint opportunities57. 
There were also some fears in Norway about energy cooperation with Russia. Fredric 
Hauge from Bellona, for instance, is convinced that Russian authorities can use Shtokman as 
a modern form of industry espionage. He points out that Russians do not have underwater 
technologies and will try to get access to the Norwegian technology and then will use it on 
other fields. That is a very interesting point of view but quite unfeasible58.  
 
54 Bruland, 1989 
55 Ibid. 
56 Godzimirski, 2007, p.8. 
57 Ibid. 
58 http://www.tu.no/nyheter/offshore/article54681.ece  
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One Russian expert mentions that Gazprom needs support from European corporations 
in its expansion on the continent. Gazprom is trying to strengthen positions in Europe that is 
why it is choosing companies from European countries59. For example, Total has no serious 
technical advantage compared to other western companies, so there must be political motives, 
supposes analyst Ekaterina Kravchenko60.  
It is necessary to mention that Norway has always been quite optimistic about its 
participation in development of the Shtokman field. Frederic Hauge, for instance, had no 
doubts that Statoil and Hydro would be among the companies Gazprom would choose as 
partners61. Norway’s confusion about Gazprom’s decision to develop the Shtokman field on 
its own was big, but it seems that Norway has never said good-bye to all hopes about 
cooperation with Russia on this project. 
 
4.4. Media evaluations 
A brief analysis of the titles of articles published in main Russian and Norwegian 
media about the Shtokman field shows that this topic caused various interpretations and 
valuations. Here we present just some central views expressed in Russian newspapers. 
“Rossijskaya gazeta”, for instance, writes that a lot is expected from Russia, but little 
is offered in return62. It compares EU’s version of the Energy Charter with a one-way street. 
None of potential partners could offer Gazprom assets that would satisfy the requirements of 
the Shtokman field. That’s why Gazprom first decided to develop the field on its own, but 
participation of western companies could be reduced to field’s service. Thus, Gazprom’s 
decision is quite rational and has a reliable explanation. Indeed, why should Gazprom make 
concessions to western companies if their proposals do not meet the Russian requirements?  
Gazprom’s decision to develop the field on its own and revision of agreements about 
PSA got foreign investors into bewilderment. In reply Germany and France decided to create 
energy alliance within EU without participation of third countries, that is Russia. The 
president of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso suggested “to insist on Russia’s 
ratification of the Energy Charter” in order to force Russia to give an opportunity to third 
countries to use oil and gas pipelines. As “Rossijskaya gazeta” further mentions, it has 
 
59 http://www.rosbalt.ru/print/400961.html  
60 Ibid.  
61 http://www.tu.no/nyheter/offshore/article54681.ece  
62 Rossijskaya gazeta, 24 October 2006. 
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become fashionable to be guided by terminology of “energy security”. The Energy Charter 
was approved in Europe, and Russia signed it but didn’t ratify. In a reply Russia was accused 
of using its energy power in political purposes. It is the same as to blame France for use of its 
perfumery power, notes the Russian newspaper63.  
The French Total announced that it would join the Shtokman development project on 
“partnership conditions” though it had rejected to collaborate with Gazprom after Alexei 
Miller’s statement in October 2006. So, as “Rossijskaya gazeta” asserts, the political 
excitement falls down very quickly, but business interests force to accept new game rules 
introduced by Moscow. Later the political explanation of choosing Total as a partner was 
underlined in several Russian sources. Experts were sure that the main argument in favor of 
Total was the “great policy”. Putin hoped that France would speak against the new Energy 
directive of EU, thinks analyst of East Gas Analysis Mikhail Korchemkin64. 
Another Russian newspaper, “Ekspert”, writes that there exist logical explanations of 
Gazprom’s decision on exclusion of international partners. First of all, two American 
companies were refused because of unsuccessful negotiations between the USA and Russia 
about Russia’s entrance into WTO. Then, the French Total didn’t get a stake because of its 
mistakes in development of another Russian field. And, finally, Statoil and Hydro were 
excluded because none of the companies managed to offer appropriate proposals65. But, in 
spite of this fact, Norway still believes in strengthening its relationship with Russia. The 
whole article is focused on collaboration between Russia and Norway and cooperative 
relationship between these two countries. Norwegian point of view is presented in the report 
made by minister of foreign affairs Jonas Gahr Støre, where he underlines that Norway still 
believes that its experience and modern technologies will be useful for developing the 
recourses of the Barents Sea. And, what is more important, Støre mentions “several times that 
he is not going to comment “conjectures” about Russian political motives to develop the 
Shtokman field on its own”66. In general, this article in “Ekspert” gives quite positive 
comments on Norwegian-Russian relationship thus not excluding possible cooperation in the 
North.  
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4.5. Other points of view on Shtokman negotiations 
The “wave” of negotiations on the development of the Shtokman field was also 
commented in many international sources. Here is the article “Shock as Russia goes solo on 
gas field” published on 9 October 2006 on BBC portal. The author is talking about “frustrated 
Americans”, “shocked Norwegians” and “the international reaction of dismay”. He asserts 
that the rejection of the international partners hit the Americans particularly hard, as its two 
contenders, Chevron and ConocoPhillips, would not only be denied a place on board the $20 
bn project. In addition, Gazprom signaled that the US would be denied much-anticipated gas 
supplies, which they had hoped would be shipped in liquefied form in super-tankers from 
Murmansk. He criticizes president Vladimir Putin for milking the Shtokman project for what 
it has been worth, having using the promise of participation in the project as a carrot in 
negotiations on a broad range of subjects – including slow-moving talks about Russia’s entry 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO). As it’s easy to see, development of the Shtokman 
field affects not only the energy relationship with international actors, but provokes many 
political questions. It is closely related to the economic growth of Russia in the last years and 
this fact provokes fear and gives concerns. 
Another critical view on the Shtokman field is presented in the article by 
A.M.Samsam Bakhtiari (October 2006), who was a senior expert employed by the National 
Iranian Oil Company and advisor to the Oil Depletion Analysis Centre. Bakhtiari asserts that, 
in spite of Gazprom’s decision to develop the field’s resources on its own, the problem is that 
“no one believes that Gazprom (or even all of the Russian companies bunched together) can 
hope tackle the formidable challenges posed by the development of Shtokman”67. He is quite 
pessimistic about the dates of project execution and says that those who predict that first 
phase will come on stream by 2010-2011 “either believe in Santa Claus or simply don’t know 
what they are talking about”. Bakhtiari underlines the importance of Shtokman for EU, since 
EU “soon being bent on getting every single cubic meter of gas it can possibly pipe”. 
Bakhtiari’s doubts about the dates of project execution seem to be true, but his statement 
about Gazprom as “the main problem for Shtokman” is arguably, though fair to some extent. 
He points out that Gazprom is a state within the state and that is why it placed political 
appointees in its top management (e.g. Alexey Miller, Dmitry Medvedev – the present 
president of the Russian Federation). But maybe, on the contrary, it’s a plus for Russia and 
Russian energy policy? In Bakhtiari’s opinion, this situation might be adequate for the 
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political power to retain total control but highly detrimental for executing mega-projects 
which require multifaceted management skills and seasoned decision-makers. But probably, if 
not the dominating role of Gazprom, the development of the Shtokman field would have 
never started at all and Russia would have not increased its strength on the world energy 
arena.  
The interesting thing is that Bakhtiari almost predicts the final partners of Gazprom. 
He argues that probably the best for Russians would be to get the Norwegians on board and 
also make room for the French Total. As we can see today, his predictions came true. 
Thus, as we have discussed above, Gazprom itself and its constantly changing 
decisions about the fate of the Shtokman field provoked a lot of criticism and debates among 
international actors, first of all Norway. 
The main focus of this part was on the events that happened in the period September 
2005 – October 2007. This relatively short period of time has played an important role in the 
Shtokman’s fate. Finally there were chosen two international partners and conditions of 
collaboration were worked out. As we have seen, Gazprom’s decision was determined by 
economic as well as by political reasons. In spite of the original conclusion to develop the 
field on its own, it became obvious that international participation is needed, both in terms of 
financing, technological experience and developing energy relations with other countries.  
In the next chapter we examine some parts of the Russian energy strategy to 2020 in 
order to view Russia’s priorities in energy development. 
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5. Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2020 
Russia is a major player in world energy markets, it has more proven natural gas 
reserves than any other country, is among the top ten in proven oil reserves, is the largest 
exporter of natural gas, the second largest oil exporter, and the third largest energy 
consumer68. So, Russian energy reserves play an important role in economic and political life 
of the country as well as help to strengthen its position as world energy power.  
The Russian Energy Strategy is an important source of information about priorities 
and objectives of country’s energy development and its collaboration with international 
actors. It may provide an answer to some contemporary questions and give an explanation of 
the most controversial and relevant problems of Russian energy policy. Here we will not 
discuss all aspects of the energy strategy but rather focus on some issues that seem to be the 
most relevant for our discussion.  
The Russian Energy Strategy is a document which concretizes aims, tasks and the 
main trends of a long-term energy state policy during the concerned period of time69. The 
document is divided into several central parts, but we will concentrate on the development of 
fuel and energy complex, gas industry, external energy policy and scientific, technical and 
innovation policy in fuel and energy complex. Probably this document will help us to 
understand better the role of the Shtokman field in the Russian energy strategy and the role of 
natural resources in the process of creating a dynamic economy. 
We start with some factors that affect functionality and development of the fuel and 
energy industries and at the same time pose threat to the energy safety of Russia: 
• high degree of wear of the main funds (more that 50%); 
• remaining shortage of investment resources in the fuel and energy  sectors 
            (except for the oil industry) and their misallocation. With the high 
            investment potential of fuel and energy complex industries, the influx of 
            foreign investments is less than 13% from financing of all the capital 
            investments. At the same time 95% of these investments account for the oil 
industry; 
 
68 Gelb, 2006 
69 Energeticheskaya strategiya Rossii na period do 2020 goda, 2003  
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• lag of the productive potential of fuel and energy complex from the world 
  science and technology level; 
• lag of the development and objective growth of costs for developing 
               prospective raw materials base for hydrocarbons production, especially 
   regarding the gas industry; 
• lag of the market infrastructure and civilized, competitive energy market; 
• remaining high stress on the environment resulting from fuel and energy 
   industry activity; 
• great dependence of oil and gas sector, and as a result of state incomes, on 
               the world energy market conditions; 
• absence of a developed and stable legislation that would fully take into 
      account all the specifics of fuel and energy industries functionality70. 
As it is stated in the document, there are two main problems that have to be solved in 
order to provide energy safety of the country. First, it is necessary to upgrade the 
technological base of the fuel and energy complex and to provide the reproduction of its 
manufactured resource base. In the current decade, because of limited nature of investments 
(except for the oil industry) the technological modernization will first of all take place at the 
existing industry capacities, and later on by means of its cardinal reconstruction and creation 
of new capacities. Then, the pattern of consumption and distribution of fuel energy sources 
will have to be modified. So, as it is easy to see, there are many large-scale issues that need 
further development and analysis. Collaboration with other countries, most likely, will play a 
crucial role in this process. In order to address this aspect, it is necessary to draw attention on 
priorities in the external energy policy of Russia. 
As it is stated in the Russian energy strategy, the state energy policy must be directed 
on the change from the role of supplier of raw resources to the role of substantive member of 
the world energy market. It is emphasized that the strengthening of Russian positions on the 
world oil and gas markets is a strategically important task nowadays. As we have discussed in 
the first chapter, Gazprom plays and will play a crucial role in this process. It has an important 
function as an instrument of strengthening Russian position in the world market. 
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There is a new factor for the period up to 2020 – the participation of Russia, as a large 
supplier of energy resources, in securing the world energy safety. The strategic interests of 
Russia are as following: forming of the common energy and energy and transport 
infrastructure in the regions of Europe and Asia, development of the international energy and 
transport systems, providing the indiscriminately transit of energy. Then, special attention 
focuses on Russia as the greatest producer, exporter and consumer of energy resources in the 
world. It is essential to the country to have a dialog both with the countries-producers and 
countries-consumers, taking part in the work of international energy conferences, cooperating 
with the industrially-developed countries on the basis of declaration about cooperation with 
IEA and in the framework of G8, cooperating with the leading countries-exporters of oil – 
independent and the members of OPEC in order to provide the fair prices for energy 
resources. It is underlined that the market of Central and Western Europe remains one of the 
greatest markets in the forthcoming 20 years, while USA can become the long-term market 
for sale of oil industry production. The American capital can become the source of 
investments in the development of industry and export trends of the Russian oil transport. 
Besides, the United States is a prospective sale market of Russian energy atomic industry, and 
later - LNG71. Here the Shtokman field can be viewed as an example of how Russian energy 
strategy is being realized in practice. Both American and European markets are of great 
importance for Russia, but, as we have mentioned in the previous chapter, choosing European 
actors for the developing of Shtokman illustrated the fact that Europe was the main priority. 
For the years ahead, the export of energy resources will remain the key factor both for 
the development of national economy and for the economic and political position of Russia in 
the world community. Integration of Russia with the world economy, perspectives of entry 
into The World Trade Organization (WTO), liberalization of gas market in Europe and 
changes in the foreign market are requiring reconsideration of tactics not only of Russian 
energy companies, but also of the state as a whole72. The energy strategy provides the 
development of a constructive dialog in energy area with European countries which are the 
main consumers of Russian fuel and energy resources nowadays. The forms of collaboration 
will include realization of joint investment projects, first of all of energy transport, and a 
broad involvement of European investors into the projects of development of oil-and-gas 
production on the Russian territory. In the second half of the forecasted period Russia’s entry 
into the world market of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is possible. 
 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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The markets of Western and Central Europe are mentioned as one of the most 
prominent in the forthcoming 20-25 years. It is essential to continue a constructive dialog that 
is aimed at broadening the market of Russian energy resources both with the European Union 
and other European countries. Cooperation may include realization of common energy 
projects, experience exchange in the area of application of the achievements of science to 
production and joint operations in energy-saving. Organization of parallel functioning of 
Russian power grid and European power grids is provided. It should secure equitable access 
for Russia to the European market of total energy system, development of trade relations, 
realization of dimensioned system effects and a qualitative new level of cooperation in power 
industry. USA may become a long-term market for production of Russian oil industry and 
American capital – a source of investments into the industry and export directions of Russian 
oil transportation. Again, it is stated in the document that in the future USA may become a 
potential market of LNG73. Strong positions of Russia on the world energy markets will not 
only provide stable income from export production of fuel and energy complex, but also 
essentially strengthen economic and political positions of the country in the world.  
Example with the development of the Shtokman field illustrates how aims and 
purposes of the Russian Energy Strategy are realized in practice. Shtokman can be viewed as 
an important tool in the process of their realization. Cooperation with Russia and development 
of the Shtokman field in particular, is of great importance for Europe since Russia is the 
dominant natural gas supplier to Europe. Some countries are entirely or largely dependent 
upon Russian natural gas. Of Russia’s total natural gas exports of 7.1 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 
2004, 6.7 tcf went to European countries, including destinations in Eastern Europe. Russian 
natural gas is imported in large quantities by European countries and represents very high 
percentages of the total gas consumption of a number of them (See Table 1)74. 
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Table 1. Dependence Upon Russian Natural Gas 
by Selected European Countries, 2004 
Natural Gas Imports from Russia  
 
Country 
Quantity 
(billion cu.ft./yr) 
% of Domestic 
Consumption 
Germany 1,290 39 
Italy 855 31 
Turkey 506 65 
France 406 24 
Austria 212 69 
Poland 212 43 
Netherlands 94 6 
Greece 78 82 
Sweden 39 b 
Belgium 7 l 
Denmark ª b 
Ireland ª b 
Portugal ª b 
Spain ª b 
United Kingdom ª b 
.  
ª. Zero or less than 500 million cubic feet. 
b. Zero or less than 0.5%. 
 
As we can see from the Table 1, France is on the top among the countries that import 
natural gas from Russia. Thus, France’s interest in Shtokman is quite explainable. Thus, as we 
have already discussed in the first chapter, cooperation with Total on Shtokman is mutually 
beneficial. In the Russian Energy Strategy up to 2020 the importance of integration of Russia 
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with world economy is emphasized, as well as plans about entry into WTO. So, Shtokman is a 
step forward to realization of these plans – cooperation with French Total can provide support 
in Gazprom’s expansion in Europe (since France has a large impact on EU politics) and 
contribute to Russia’s entry into WTO. In addition, decision on delivering gas from Shtokman 
to European market and not American revealed Russian priorities.  
Norway can be interesting for Russia for some other reasons. It was mentioned above 
that Norway possesses modern and complex technologies and in addition has a great 
experience of developing offshore fields. In that way collaboration with the northern neighbor 
is of great importance for Russia, especially with respect to the Shtokman field.  
The eighth part of the Russian energy strategy focuses on scientific, technical and 
innovation policy in the fuel and energy complex. It is not very long and mostly points to the 
priorities of this policy and methods of their achievement within the framework of Russia. 
Not so much attention is paid to the necessity of international collaboration in this area. In the 
document we find that one of the priorities of scientific, technical and innovation policy is the 
use of potential for international collaboration for application of the best world achievements 
and leading out domestic development on a higher level75. It is also mentioned that the 
important task in the area of international scientific and technical collaboration is the creation 
of favorable conditions and mechanisms for its development. Thus, state support of 
international collaboration is needed in order to realize the major innovation projects of 
national significance76. These statements are rather vague and not specific. As it is easy to 
see, the development of scientific, technical and innovation activity mostly takes place within 
the national borders, though not excluding international collaboration in this area. Among the 
problems of the Russian energy complex we mentioned the need for technological 
modernization and upgrading of the technological base. But it seems that the process of 
innovation and competence development is not the central issue in the document. Still, the 
political perspective is the dominant in the Russian energy strategy. The development of the 
Shtokman field can be sooner viewed as a political instrument in the Russian energy strategy 
and to a lesser degree as an instrument for building up a national innovation system. Though 
technological competence of international actors is of great importance for Russia (in our case 
for the successful development of Shtokman), the political aspect seems to be the central. 
 
75 Energeticheskaya strategiya Rossii na period do 2020 goda, 2003. 
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Thus, here lies the difference between the Norwegian strategy that we will discuss in the next 
chapter and the Russian energy strategy.  
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6. The economic perspective on the Shtokman development 
In the previous chapter we presented the political perspective on the development of 
the Shtokman field. This topic has been discussed for a long time now and there have been 
published many articles about the political aspect of the Shtokman project. Thus, this debate 
around Shtokman is well-known. We pointed to the obvious political nature of the decisions 
on Shtokman and underlined that the project is a part of world energy “game”. But here arises 
another, probably the most interesting and not so widely discussed question – can the 
Shtokman field be used for achieving other goals as well? Is it just a political instrument or 
maybe a part of the Russian strategy which is aimed at developing technology, knowledge and 
competence? In the chapter about the Shtokman field it was mentioned that Russia does not 
possess necessary technologies for the development of such complex and big fields as 
Shtokman. Thus, international experience and competence are needed in order to develop the 
Shtokman field. From this perspective, Russia can use its natural resources for building up 
national competence and technology and developing innovation system. It is interesting to 
discuss to what extent the project is used in order to enhance the technological capabilities in 
Russia and to develop many parts of Russian economy and industry. In other words, we will 
try to view this energy game from another perspective. On the one hand we have Russia and 
its natural resources and on the other hand we have international actors that possess necessary 
technology, knowledge and competence for developing Russian resources. Thus, the point of 
contact seems to be obvious. But will Russia use this opportunity for building up its national 
competence and innovation system? That is a very complicated question and thus it is 
interesting to discuss how abundant natural resources may become a “blessing” or “curse”.  
 
6.1. Abundant natural resources – “curse” or “blessing”? 
Both Norway and Russia are rich in natural resources and in the 1950s and 60s 
economists generally saw abundant natural resource endowments as facilitating a country’s 
rapid development77. But in spite of this fact, Russia and Norway are on different levels of 
economic development today, where Norway occupies a very high position with the greatest 
GDP among all OECD countries78. In the last two decades economists have come to see rich 
natural resource endowments as a “curse” or “precious bane” that inevitably undermines 
 
77 Ahrend, 2006, p.5. 
78 Wicken, 2008, p.25. 
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development and slows economic growth79. As Sachs and Warner mention, in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries resource-poor countries such as Switzerland and Japan surged ahead 
of resource-abundant economies such as Russia80. But, however, many of the world’s most 
developed countries – Australia, Canada, Scandinavian countries, and the Unites States have 
successfully developed on the basis of their resource base. Though having a rich natural 
resource base has some obvious advantages, resource-based development presents important 
challenges. 
There are several theoretical approaches to the problem of natural resource “curse” but 
there is no common and consistent theoretical argumentation of correlation between sustained 
low growth and abundant natural resources. Researches point to different explanations, both 
political and economic. Nevertheless, there is one level where many theories seem to have a 
common basis – there is a premise in analysis that resource-based industries to a less extent 
contribute to dynamic changes and development tendencies in economy that are necessary for 
sustained growth81. According to Wicken, this is related either to the fact that resource-based 
industries do not create dynamic linkages to other parts of economy or to the lack of learning 
processes in resource-based industries. Some theories mark that a lot of elements of resource-
based industries in economy lead to reduced learning and innovation, both in this type of 
industry and in economy in general82.  
The most common explanation of correlation between industry structure and sustained 
economic growth is connected with the term “Dutch disease”. The term originated in the 
Netherlands during the 1960s, when the high revenue generated by its natural gas discovery 
led to a sharp decline in the competitiveness of its other, non-booming tradable sector. 
Despite the revenue windfall the new discovery brought, the Netherlands experienced a 
drastic decline in economic growth. This economic paradox has since been recognized as the 
situation in which a booming sector adversely affects the performance of other sectors of an 
economy, and in particular, the non-booming tradable sector83. Long dependence of an 
economy on natural resource exports weakens incentives for developing manufacturing 
industries and new technologies. But exactly the technological progress and not accumulation 
of production factors serves as source for sustained growth. As Hirschman argues, when 
decline in manufacturing sector is considered as a problem, then it is connected to the 
 
79 Ahrend, 2006, p.2.  
80 Sachs and Warner, 1995, p.2. 
81 Wicken, 2008, p.26. 
82 Ibid. 
83 http://pgpblog.worldbank.org/the_dutch_disease_theory_and_evidence  
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assumption that manufacturing contributes to a more dynamic development than resource-
based sectors84. He asserts that the generation of inter-industry linkages in economy is the 
basis for development and growth and that resource-based industries create less such linkages. 
As Wicken observes, these theories emphasize that learning and innovation are unequal in 
different parts of economy.  
Sachs and Warner support Matsuyama’s conception that differences in dynamics occur 
because learning processes vary between different sectors in economy. The central argument 
is that industry has increasing returns to scale in education or job training. They use a model 
where there takes place no learning in the resource-based part of economy. The conclusion is 
that an economy with great natural resources sector and small manufacture sector has a lower 
growth and dynamics than an economy with great manufacture sector85.  
Chris Freeman is a representative for another approach based on the statement that it is 
not so much what is produced, as how it is produced86. According to this theory, the dynamic 
process of productivity growth arises from innovation and adoption of new technologies that 
propels development. It is pointed to the world’s most developed countries, Australia, 
Canada, the United States and Scandinavian countries that have successfully developed on the 
basis of their natural resources. Success has less to do with what a country produces in 
particular, and everything to do with the way in which it produces it. In particular it depends 
on establishing an environment that enables innovation and the adoption of technologies87.  
 
6.2. Innovation and systems of innovation. 
Innovation and adoption of new technologies lead to dynamic process of productivity 
growth, which in its turn leads to development. Thus, it is essential to understand how 
innovations happen. First of all, it is necessary to mention that innovation is a complex 
phenomenon and, according to Kline and Rosenberg, there is no single correct formula, but 
rather a complex of different ideas and solutions that are needed for effective innovation88. 
Economists have analyzed innovation as a “black box” – a system containing unknown 
components and processes. As Fagerberg points out, the processes that are happening 
obviously have to do with learning, which occurs in organized settings, such as groups, teams, 
 
84 Wicken, 2008, p.27. 
85 Wicken, 2008, p.28. 
86 Smith, 2008, p.13. 
87 Ferranti, Perry, Lederman and Maloney, 2002, p.52. 
88 Kline and Rosenberg, 1986, p.279.  
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firms and networks89. Thus, innovation process involves many actors and firms do not 
normally innovate in isolation, but in collaboration and interdependence with other 
organizations. All these actors are components of systems for the creation of knowledge and 
innovations emerge in such “systems of innovation”90. Nelson and Freeman focus on the 
national level and “the national system of innovation, which they define as “the networks of 
institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, 
modify and diffuse new technologies”91. Edquist gives a more general definition of (national) 
systems of innovation which includes “all important economic, social, political, 
organizational, institutional and other factors that influence the development, diffusion and 
use of innovations”92. He also notes that there exist other specifications of systems of 
innovation. Carlsson and Stankiewicz, for instance, focus on “technological systems”, arguing 
that these are unique to technology fields. They define them as “a dynamic network of agents 
interacting in a specific, economic/industrial under a particular institutional infrastructure and 
involved in the generation, diffusion and utilization of technology”93. Breschi and Malerba 
present the sectoral approach that focuses on a group of firms that develop and manufacture 
the products of a specific sector and that generate and utilize the technologies of this sector. In 
addition, Cooke and Braczyk and others have developed the concept of “regional innovation 
system”94. But, as Edquist asserts, all these perspectives may be clustered as variants of a 
single generic “systems of innovation” approach.  
Systems, as networks, consist of a set of activities or actors that are interlinked. Thus, 
linkages between them are essential for system’s functioning and if one complementary 
component is lacking, or fails to progress or develop, this may block or slow down the growth 
of the entire system. Powell and Grodal define interorganizational networks as a means by 
which organizations can pool or exchange resources, and jointly develop new ideas and 
skills95. They argue that in fields where scientific or technological progress is developing 
rapidly, and the sources of knowledge are widely distributed, no single firm has all the 
necessary skills to stay on top of all areas of progress and bring significant innovations to 
market. Thus, networks are of great importance for innovative activity and can become the 
locus if innovation, as the creation of knowledge is crucial to improving competitive position. 
 
89 Handbook,  2005, p.13. 
90 Handbook, 2005, p.182. 
91 Fagerberg, 2003, p.39. 
92 Handbook, 2005, p.183. 
93 Fagerberg, 2003, p.42. 
94 Handbook, 2005, p.184. 
95 Handbook, 2005, p.59. 
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In our case, linkages of oil sector to other sectors, such as engineering, capital goods, machine 
producers, research organizations are important components of this system of innovative 
activity. Wicken notes that resource-based industries are great consumers of goods and 
services from other sectors. Especially it refers to oil and gas sector which is both a customer 
of services (for example, transport and other business services) and manufactured goods96. 
Thus, dynamics in resource-based industries lies in generation of technology and knowledge 
development and economic activity in other sectors. 
Blomström and Kokko’s work on Scandinavia and Irwin’s and Wright’s work on the 
United States show that development in these countries  took place in a context of rich 
networks of universities, research institutes, and high levels of human capital that led to an 
incessant process of innovation97. In the article “From Natural Resources to the Knowledge 
Economy: Trade and Job Quality” Ferranti, Perry, Lederman and Maloney discuss, in 
addition, the Scandinavian experience of building strengths in natural resources. They show 
that the Scandinavian experience with forestry highlights not only another case of sustainable 
growth based on natural resources, but also the vital importance of knowledge networks or 
clusters to generate productivity growth, competitiveness and new ideas98. Forestry offered 
downstream demand for both paper and pulping technologies, as well as transport products 
developed by Saab and Volvo in Sweden.    
The Norwegian example demonstrates how abundant natural resources can become a 
“blessing” for country’s economic development. Resource-based technology and knowledge 
development have been moved by knowledge organizations, technology enterprises, finance 
institutions, capital suppliers and others who were involved in this process. It has generated 
growth of what we can describe as clusters or innovation systems which have functioned as 
dynamic elements in Norwegian economy99. Therefore it is interesting to discuss the 
Norwegian example in more details. 
 
6.3. Norway’s “blessing” 
Development of the Norwegian oil industry is perceived as a process when Norwegian 
authorities and Norwegian economy developed knowledge and abilities that made it possible 
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to master oil industry on its own. The building of oil industry in Norway was a huge transfer 
project of techniques, knowledge, organization and technologies that from the starting point 
were controlled and used by the international oil companies100. Not only new technology was 
transferred, used and adapted to a new geographic area but also Norwegian actors worked out 
competence for taking part in the search, production and distribution of petroleum. Thus, 
Norway can serve as a model of how an innovation system looks like in practice. 
At first, the Norwegian strategy was about getting foreign companies to Norway. This 
process was called “fornorskningen” (“making it Norwegian”)101. As Ryggvik observes, when 
in the beginning of the 1960s international oil companies wanted to start up oil explorations in 
the North Sea, there were positive attitudes towards foreign multinational companies in 
Norway102. He points to the complicated economic situation in Norway after the economic 
recession in 1958, when unemployment was increasing for the first time after the war. The 
capital formation was not big enough to create the necessary growth in employment. 
Therefore international capital was seen as an important alternative. In the spring 1959 there 
was established a special committee for attracting international capital to Norway. Norwegian 
authorities worked out an institutional framework, or contract, between the Norwegian state 
and international oil companies in order to lead the technology transfer and the development 
of the Norwegian oil policy. Active state involvement has played a crucial role in the process 
of building up the Norwegian oil industry. Many sociologists have emphasized how 
Norwegian oil policy has changed keeping time with correlation of forces between the 
Norwegian state and international oil companies. The Norwegian radical and self-confident 
state has al the time had an objective of securing the biggest share of oil rent. Thus, 
“fornorskningspolitikken” is viewed as a self-evident lever for achieving this goal103. 
Gradually, new knowledge and technologies were taken into use and it lead to 
establishing and developing of new fields. At the same time there were created new methods 
and equipment that made it possible to develop a growing part of the recourses. Thus, the first 
stage in Norwegian oil activity was adaptation to a new innovation system. The network 
between different actors was established and it provided a basis for innovative processes. The 
network gradually became an industrial cluster104. Both public institutions and Norwegian 
private actors operated in such a way that they represented “national capabilities” so that it 
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was possible to use them as a basis for subsequent development. Engen uses the concept of 
“recipient competence”(mottakerkompetanse) which is in relation with national capabilities 
notion. Recipient competence consists of several knowledge fragments that more or less 
function together and form national prerequisites for receiving and adopting a technological 
system such as an oil industry.   
Technology transfer was a crucial part of building up oil industry in Norway. The 
concept of transfer refers not only no a sender but also to a recipient. Thus, technology 
transfer includes the description of how the technologies are being received and applied to a 
new environment. It means that new persons and organizations have mastered the ability of 
using the transferred techniques. The problem is that it is necessary to acquire sufficient 
knowledge for applying new technology from other countries105. As Engen points out, on 
later stages it will become relevant to develop the technology further because gradually it will 
be made new demands to adaptation. One of the prerequisites for this is the process of 
technology transfer itself. It is essential to possess enough knowledge about technology’s 
principles of operation so that new actors will be able to undertake innovations and 
improvements. That’s what is called “technological capabilities”.  
Technological development is a process in which many actors take part on different 
levels. Interaction between actors can establish technological systems106. As Engen notes, 
these interaction processes vary from industry to industry and from nation to nation. In some 
sectors research institutions and universities play the central role, in others not. Through 
transfers and direct control the technology policy is central in some industrial systems, but is 
absent in others. At the same time variations depend on the type of industry and national 
context and in some contexts we can talk about national innovation systems. The quality and 
effectiveness of country’s public infrastructure, legislation, financial institutions and 
objectives of the economic policy will be crucial for establishing of innovation systems.   
The “fornorskningspolitikken” that we mentioned avove was strengthened by “en 
norsk teknologisk stil” (Norwegian technology style)107. As Francis Sejersted mentions, the 
history of the Norwegian style is the history of how imported and domestic competences are 
combined in the development of an own technological concept. Development of the 
technological competence was in many respects a question of working out a strategy for 
getting out of the trap which occurs when those who have competence get assignment while 
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others can develop this kind of competence only if they get assignment. It was of great 
importance to build up an oil industry that in the future could come out into the world market 
on its own. 
The most important tool in this “fornorskningspolitikken” was Statoil, a 100% state 
owned company108. As Helge Ryggvik maintains, Norway has managed to ensure the national 
control over oil activity through developing a strong independent oil industry, not less by 
establishing of the governmental Statoil109. In that way it has been guaranteed that an 
essential part of oil rent has stayed in Norway. Then it has also been secured that a part if this 
income goes to the nation and not just to the rich elite. Ryggvik points out that it is a fact that 
many oil producing countries in the poor parts of the world have taken Norway as an 
example. From the moment when Statoil with financial support from Norwegian authorities 
was able to do everything on its own, Norway was already in a totally different situation for 
negotiations with internatio
Thus, Norwegian example demonstrates how abundant natural resources may become 
a “blessing” for a country’s economic development. As Wicken concludes, this is to a great 
extent a result of a long history of how a country has developed its competence of how 
geological and biological resources can be mapped and used. In addition, the international 
technological development has generated new natural resources which Norwegian society was 
able to use110.  
 
6.4. Shtokman’s blessing? 
The Norwegian example demonstrates how a country uses its natural resource 
endowment for building up dynamic economy and innovative industry. Norway did not 
possess necessary technologies and competence but it managed to work out a strategy for 
collaboration with international actors who could contribute a lot to the development of the 
Norwegian oil industry. In our case with the Shtokman field Russia seems to be in the similar 
situation. Development of Shtokman requires complex technologies and high level of 
competence. The interesting question is whether we can find the strategy similar to the 
Norwegian example in the Russian energy policy. As Jakub Godzimirski mentions, the 
Norwegian state’s oil and gas exploitation policy, its control of the energy sector and its 
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policy of saving oil and gas revenues are often presented in the Russian media as an example 
to be followed111. Thus, it is interesting to discuss what is necessary for the development of 
Shtokman and what will have to be built up.  
Many experts point to the complicated technological structure that is needed for 
successful development of the Shtokman field. The technical difficulties in developing the 
Shtokman field are substantial (see chapter about Shtokman). The distance to shore, great 
water depths, drifting ice and high waves can pose problems. Thus, Gazprom needs the 
participation of international companies with offshore experience, both for technical and 
financial aspects of the project. Multinational enterprises (MNEs), in our case StatoilHydro 
and Total are important instruments for building up Russian competence. MNEs affect the 
development and diffusion of innovations across national borders through a number of 
mechanisms, among which is FDI, for instance112. MNEs are central economic actors in 
international technological and scientific collaborations. In the Shtokman project their work 
will include improvement of the geological data, development solutions, and commercial 
evaluations of the market for gas and condensate from the field113. It is anticipated that the 
Shtokman field will require three or four phases for full field development. The development 
will include up to four platforms. It is estimated that the total number of wells required to 
develop the Shtokman field will be around 156, which breaks down to 144 production wells, 
three monitor wells and nine reserve wells. In addition, it has been estimated that the 
development will require four 42in pipelines to be laid between the offshore platforms and the 
receiving facilities at Teriberka, 565km away114. Thus, the cooperation between different 
actors who possess different types of knowledge and competence is of great importance for 
the development of the field. Rich networks, which include research institutes, technological 
enterprises, finance institutions – which will develop the technological basis for the 
development of the field – are essential for the innovative process. Resource-based 
technology and knowledge, moved by these actors, will generate growth. Thus, when 
components of this innovation system are already defined, it is necessary to establish linkages 
between the actors in order to make the whole system function. The environment of learning, 
research and innovation, in which the process of resource-led development is embedded is 
significant. 
 
111 Godzimirski, 2007, p.6. 
112 Handbook 2005, p.318. 
113 Moe, 2004, p.18.  
114 http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/shtokman/  
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The ability to adapt and disseminate new technologies is another aspect of innovation 
process. In order to build up competence for the development of Shtokman, Russia has to 
absorb new ideas and apply them in the natural resource area. That is what is often called 
absorptive capacity, which is essential for innovative process. Absorptive capacity is defined 
as the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it and 
apply it to commercial ends115. In addition, on order to be able to absorb outside knowledge it 
is necessary to have prior related knowledge. Though it may be not possible to systematically 
create innovations, it is possible to prepare for technological and commercial opportunities 
and challenges that will occur116. Ability to absorb new knowledge is directly connected with 
the “catch-up” question. “Catch-up” relates to the ability of a single country to narrow the gap 
in productivity and income vis-à-vis a leader country117. As Fagerberg and Godinho observe, 
only countries that have invested massively in the formation of skills and R&D infrastructure 
seem to be able to catch up (while those who have not fall further behind). Thus, in order to 
be able to develop the Shtokman field Russia has to invest more into R&D activities and 
enable network of educational institutions. But, the Russian energy strategy to 2020 that was 
discussed above does not give so much consideration to this aspect. It rather underlines the 
political aims of energy development and international politics energy game. In addition, the 
debates around Shtokman are mostly focused on the political perspective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p.128 
116 Ferranti, Perry, Lederman and Maloney, 2002, p.57. 
117 Handbook 2005, p.514. 
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7. Conclusion and suggestions for further research 
This thesis attempted to explore the political aspect of the development of the 
Shtokman field and then analyze its economic perspective. The first part of our discussion 
was focused on the world energy context and the role of Russia in it. From the point of view 
of strategic interests Russia is viewed as a key unit in the system of world energy security. It 
plays and will continue to play one of the main roles in supply and sale of carbohydrates in 
the world. Thus, situation in Russian energy policy and development of new fields in 
particular is important for many international actors.  
The meaning of natural resources as the most important economic and political factor 
in sustainable development of the country is emphasized in Vladimir Putin’s academic paper. 
His work has a lot in common with the Russian Energy Strategy to 2020. Both documents 
mention the importance of natural resources for Russian energy policy and foreign policy. 
Thus, the political perspective seems to be central in the Russian energy strategy. 
The “wave” of negotiations on the Shtokman field illustrates that Gazprom’s decision 
on Shtokman was determined by economic as well as by political reasons. In spite of the 
original conclusion to develop the field on its own, it became obvious that international 
participation is needed, both in terms of financing, technological experience and developing 
energy relations with other countries.  
The Russian Energy Strategy to 2020 mostly emphasizes the importance of 
strengthening of Russian positions on the world oil and gas markets. The eighth part of the 
energy strategy that focuses on scientific, technical and innovation policy in the fuel and 
energy complex does not pay so much attention to the necessity of international collaboration 
in this area. The statements about priorities of scientific, technical and innovation policy are 
rather vague and not specific. The development of scientific, technical and innovation activity 
mostly takes place within the national borders, though not excluding international 
collaboration in this area. Thus, it seems that the process of innovation and competence 
development is not the central issue in the Russian Energy Strategy to 2020. Though 
technological competence of international actors is of great importance for Russia (in our case 
for the successful development of Shtokman), the political aspect seems to be the dominant 
one. 
The last part of this paper demonstrated how Norway used its natural resource 
endowment for building up dynamic economy and innovative industry. Norway did not 
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possess necessary technologies and competence but it managed to work out a strategy for 
collaboration with international actors who could contribute a lot to the development of the 
Norwegian oil industry. In our case with the Shtokman field Russia seems to be in a similar 
situation. In order to follow the Norwegian example and generate economic growth, Russia 
has to build up its national innovation system. The cooperation between different actors who 
possess different types of knowledge and competence, rich networks, which include research 
institutes, technological enterprises and finance institutions – all these components are 
essential for the innovative process. But, the “development” strategy” seems not to be central 
in Russian policy. The potential of the Shtokman project is enormous and the main question is 
whether it can become a “blessing” for Russian economy and industry. It may also happen 
that the country’s economy will follow a path close to the “resource curse” development – and 
therefore in the longer run make Russia weaker. Whether Russia is able to use its natural 
resources (the Shtokman field) in such a way that they will generate sustainable growth of 
Russian economy in the future, is a question for further research.  
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